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Revision of Transnational Investment Agreements:
Contractual Flexibility in Natural Resources Development**
THOMAS W. WALDE*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER (NIEO)
The revision of existing contractual arrangements between
transnational corporations (TNC's) and host countries has been of primor-
dial concern to developing countries particularly in the area of natural
resources. Host countries have felt that terms and conditions, imposed upon
them for extremely long durations in times of highly unequal bargaining
power and ability, had to be revised in order to allow them to attain material
and effective sovereignty over their non-renewable natural resources.
Policies based upon such objectives have clashed strongly with the interests
of TNC's in protecting advantageous investment conditions by relying on
Western countries' - the major capital exporters - concepts of inter-
national law. The full scope of such legal concepts, designed to grant utmost
protection to foreign investment, is most clearly reflected in a recent arbitra-
tion decision.'
Apart from the controversies surrounding the issue of nationalization,
the revision of the terms of an investment contract by unilateral action of
the host state, the renegotiation induced by threat of impending legislative
action, and any legislative or administrative state action affecting the
profitability of the investment project is viewed critically by many Western
states and commentators.2
*Thomas W. W'lde, Law Degree (1972), University of Frankfurt, LL.M. (Harvard)
1973, 1976/77 United Nations Associate Transnational Corporations Affairs Officer, 1978:
Doctorate in Law, University of Frankfurt, 1975-1978 (with interruptions): law practice in
Frankfurt, at present: Research Fellow at the Institut f6r Ausl'ndisches und Internationales
Wirtschaftsrecht, Frankfurt.
**The present article is based on a report "Revision of Contractual Arrangements between
TNC's and Host Countries in the Natural Resources Industries" prepared by the author for the
UN Centre on Transnational Corporations for the study Transnational Corporations in World
Development: A Re-Examination (Doe.E/C.lO/38). I acknowledge the assistance of Mr.
Joseph Findaro who helped me to analyse investment agreements. The opinions expressed are
exclusively the personal views of the author and not of the institutions the author is or has been
affiliated with.
1. Texaco v. Libya. the decision of the sole arbitrator, (Libya refused to participate) Ren6-
Jean Dupuy, has been published in 104 Clunet Journal du Droit International 350 (1977), and
commented upon by J. Lalive, Un Grand Arbitrage Petrolier Entre un Governement et duex
Societes Privees Etrangeres, id. at 319. Other arbitration decisions to be quoted in this context
are the Lena Goldfields, reprinted in 36 Cornell L.Q. 31; the Societe Rialet, see Lalive, Contracts
Between a State or a State Agency and a Foreign Company, 13 Int'l Comp. L.Q. 987 (1964); and
the Abu Dhabi, Quatar, Sapphire and ARAMCO case, see Weil, Problemes Relatifs aux Contrats
Passes entre un Etat et un Particulier, III Recuil des Cours 165 (1969).
2. See K. Bdckstiegel, Der Staat als Vertragspartner auslndischer Unternehmen 145
(197 I); Legoux, L'evolution des Idles dons les Legislations Minlitres Des Pays Neufs, 29 Revue
Juridique 6t Politique Ind6pendance et Cooperation [R.J.P.I.C.] 75 (1975); Schwebel, Inter-
national Protection of Contractual Arrangements, Proc., 53rd Meeting of Am. Soc. of Int'l L.
266(1959).
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On the other hand, associations of producer countries such as OPEC,3
and particularly the United Nations, have increasingly supported the at-
tempts of developing countries to provide legitimacy for renegotiation of ex-
isting contracts. Such developments can be seen as the evolution of an alter-
native legal order confronting traditional and new international law as
generated by Western industrialized states. The basic instruments relating to
permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNOR), in their recent
form,4 declare the nationalization of foreign owned mining operations to be
the unalienable right of host countries. These concepts of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources have been taken up as a major element of
the NIEO.5 The concept of nationalization embodies the state's right to re-
quire renegotiation of an existing arrangement instead of an outright take-
over by the government. Moreover, the revision of existing agreements has
become a major objective of authoritative UN instruments concerning the
3. OPEC has taken a particularly strong stand on the revision agreements in petroleum,
where changes of costs, prices, profitability rates, bargaining power, and bargaining sophistica-
tion have clashed with the long duration of concessions. ln Resolution XVI. 90 (1968), See 7
Int'l Legal Mat. 1183 (1968), OPEC has declared that govenments have a right to renegotiate
contracts when operators receive "excessively high net earnings after taxes." Such renegotia-
tions shall apply to the financial terms of the concession and OPEC has laid down rather con-
crete rules to determine excessive profits as well as criteria to be used for renegotiation, id.
It is remarkable to discover the parallels between the OPEC standards and comparable
standards in the U.S. Renegotiation Act of 1951, 50 U.S.C. Appx. 1211-1233 (1951) (repealed
1977), and the U.S. Armed Services Procurement Regulations. 32 C.F.R. § 3-308 (1977).
OPEC has declared that the governments be intitled to determine the new financial condi-
tions unilaterally if the operator refuses to comply with the renegotiation demand.
4. For the evolution of the permanent sovereignty concept, see G.A. Res. 626 (VII) of
1952, reprinted in [1952] U.N.Y.B. 390, 1803 (XVII) of 1962, reprinted in [1962] U.N.Y.B. 503,
2158 (XXIII) of 1966, reprinted in [19661 U.N.Y.B. 329, 2692 (XXV) of 1970, reprinted in [1970]
U.N.Y.B. 457, 3121 (XXVII) of 1973, reprinted in 13 Int'l Legal Mat. 238 (1974), 3201 (S VI) 6
U.N. GAOR (Special Sess.) Supp. (No. 1.) 5, U.N. Doe. A/9559 (1975), 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (31) 50, U.N. Doc, A/9631 (1975), 3202 (S VI) 6 U.N. GAOR (Special Sess.) Supp. (No.
1) 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1975).
For an analysis of up to 1965, see Mughraby, Permanent Sovereignty over Oil Resourses
161 passim (1966),, and recently, Kemper, Nationale Vefligung tiber nattirliche Ressourcen und
die Neve Weltwirtschaftsordnung der Vereinten Nationen (1976).
5. G.A. Res. 3202 (S VI) and 3201 (S VI), supra. note 4; G.A. Res. 3201, id., For the con-
cepts of the NIEO, see generally Sauvant & Hasenpflug, The New Internation Economic Order
(1977).
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NIEO.5 Various commentators have regarded renegotiation of existing min-
ing agreements as justified particularly:
-when rigid contractual terms provide for an excessive duration,
secured against any legislative change,
-when the agreement reflects the one-sided distribution of
bargaining power and ability in favor of the TNC,
-when circumstances have changed considerably so that the
agreement needs adjustment to existing usages and
-when the agreement hampers severely the host country's
freedom to employ its natural resources as a lever for effective
economic development. 7
II. THE FUNCTION OF "DYNAMIC" PROVISIONS IN
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
Stipulations in Contracts between TNC's and Host Countries concern
renegotiation, periodic revision, adjustment to changing circumstances, and
other measures. These provisions introduce a degree of flexibility into the
contractual regime of natural resource exploitation, and are increasingly ad-
vocated as a form of mutually acceptable instruments to implement the ob-
jectives of NIEO and PSONR. Following the recommendation of the
Group of Eminent Persons,' a number of commentators have advocated
such forms of contractual flexibility,' in order to achieve freedom from ex-
6. The General Assembly, in the Programme of Action on the Establishment of NIEO
(G.A. Res. 3202, (S VI). supra note 4, Art V (6)) has expressly decided that one of the five major
objectives of a Code of Conduct on TNCs is "'to facilitate, as necessary, the review and revision
of previously concluded arrangements." The report of the Eminent Persons to Study the Im-
pact of MNCs on Development and International Relations - ST/ESA/7 of 1974, at p. 38/39
- recognizes the "unquestionable right of host states to change the terms of an agreement by
unilateral act of sovereign legislation" and recommends periodic revision and renegotiation
clauses. Within the framework of discussions concerning a Code of Conduct for TNCs, the
issue of rcnegotiability of investment agreements, particularly in connection, with national
development plans and regional integration arrangements, has been taken up as a major point
of negotiations. See U.N. Doc. E/C. 10/31 of 1977 at p. 8; an African regional meeting (Addis
Abbaba, Jan., Feb. 1977) concerning the Code of Conduct equally demands that "TNCs shall
accept the renegotiation of agreements which are not in conformity with the NIEO in a manner
consistent with the national development objectives of the host countries."
The position paper of the Asian group provides also for "Renegotiation of Contracts and
arrangement if the costs and benefits of foreign direct investment by TNCs undergo major
changes after some time," see U.N. Doc. E/C. 10/AC. 2/3 at 23, 24 (1978).
7. See Mikdashi, The International Politics of Natural Resources 150 (1976): Penrose,
The Development of Crises Deadalus 52-53 (1975); Rouhani, A History of OPEC 272 (1971);
Schacter, Sharing the World's Resources 125 (1977); Tinbergen, Report to the Club of Rome
158 n.30 (1976); Toriguian, Legal Aspects of Oil Concessions in the Middle East 289 (1972);
Johnson, A Legal Alternative to Instability in International Oil, 6 Nat. Resources J. 368 (1966);
Moran, The Evolution of Concession Agreements in Underdeveloped Countries and the US.
National Interest, 7 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 315 (1974).
8. U.N. Doc. ST/ESA 16 at 38-39 (1974).
9. See authors cited supra note 7; Smith & Wells, Negotiating Third World Mineral
Agreements 152 (1975); Rouhani, Assignment and Renegotiation in Negotiation and Drafting
of Mining Development Agreements 21 (1976), Wells, Negotiating with Third World Govern-
ments, 55 Harv. Bus. Rev. 72 (1977).
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cessive durations of strictly drafted comprehensive contractual regimes.' 0 At
the same time possible reproaches for violating the sanctity of the contract'
by unilateral action are avoided. Among the reasons advanced are:
-Contractual flexibility channels unavoidable demands for renegotiation
into a pre-regulated procedure, thereby avoiding some of the costs of es-
calating conflicts arising from renegotiation demands imposed on both
parties.
-Contractual flexibility can provide for a gradual take-over by the host
government of the mining venture, under terms agreed upon earlier, in
line with the progress the host state is achieving in increasing its ability to
master major management functions (marketing operations, financing,
management).
-Contractual flexibility and regulated renegotiation can avoid nationaliza-
tion with all its pitfalls for the host country (cut-off from marketing,
financing, negative effects on the conditions required by new investors in
order to undertake the needed investment, payment of high compensa-
tion).
-Contractual flexibility can be an instrument to readjust dated types and
conditions of investment agreements to the new generations of contracts
emerging, as witnessed particularly in the petroleum industry. Thus,
irresistible pressures for a revision of long-term conditions can be chan-
neled and the unavoidable revision peacefully facilitated. 2
III. BASIC LEGAL CONCEPTS PERTAINING TO THE REVISION
OF INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
The practice of negotiations for contractual flexibility and for an actual
revision of existing investment contracts is interrelated with the legal discus-
sion and the pertinent controversies concerning unilaterally en-
forced revision. The analysis of practice and future perspectives undertaken
here has to take into account the basic legal concepts concerned. The core of
the controversies is: Is the host state entitled by international law to change
the existing terms of a contract with a TNC and thus force a revision of the
initial agreement?
Authors, particularly from capital-exporting countries, have repeatedly
stressed the "sanctity" of contracts as an overriding principle governing in-
10. See authors cited note 2 supra.
11. The "sanctity" of contracts is a concept particularly familiar to U.S. Law; see, e.g.,
Kuusi, State Contracts with Foreigners (1976); Weil, supra note 1; Geiger, The Unilateral
Change of Economic Development Agreements. 23 I.C.L. Q. 73 (1974); Schachter, supra note 7;
Mulack, Rechtsprobleme der Erdlkonzessionsabkommenim Nahen Osten 214 (1972),
12. In this context, Detlev Vagts' proposal for a code of conduct of unfair bargaining prac-
tices merits considerable attention as another instrument to channel renegotiation pressures
into legal channels of conflict avoidance and conflict resolution. See Coercion and Foreign In-
vestment Rearrangements. 72 AmJ.Int'l L. 17, 34 (1978).
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vestment agreements between TNC and host states. 3 Most recently, this
doctrine has been developed further, to guarantee complete protection to an
investment agreement once (as is the practice today) international arbitra-
tion, application of a not exclusively national systerm of law, and a
stabilization clause' have been stipulated. The arbitral award of Texaco-
Calasiatic v. Government of Libya' 5 grants this protection expressly only
against full nationalization; arguments will easily be construed that such
protection is also implicitly granted against the host country's demand for
renegotiation.
On the other hand, authors, mostly from developing countries -
generally of little weight in the development of a communis opinio doctorum
of Western international law - have pointed out that the host state is en-
13. Supra note 2.
14. The practice of inserting stabilization clauses is expanding in recent agreements, par-
ticularly when the investor yields considerable bargaining leverage. It is not completely clear if
the legal effect of such clauses, tying the legislative hands of the host state for periods up to 30
or 40 years, can be recognized as valid, see, e.g., Well, Les clauses de stabilisation ou
d'intangibilit6 ins6r6es dans les accord de d~veloppement iconomique, in M61anges offerts a
Charles Rousseau, 301 (1974) (recognizing the validity), Brown, Choice of Law provisions in
concessions and related contracts. 39 Mod. Law Rev. 6 (1976) (disputing the validity). Choice of
law provisions containing stabilization or "freezing" clauses are used increasingly and often
with an escalating scope and comprehensiveness, as illustrated by the following provisions from
recent agreements:
1) The traditional, and most simple, stabilization clause is to be found somewhat veiled
in a "consistency" provision such as "this agreement shall have full force and effect as a law of
Liberia and, as such, together with all Liberian laws of general application which are not incon-
sistent with or contrary to the express terms of this agreement, shall govern the rights and
obligations of the parties" (Liberia-Firestone rubber concession of 1976, Art. 30.1).
2) Quite frequent, particularly in recent Chilean copper agreements and in most agree-
ments from weak Francophonic African countries, are stabilization clauses expressly
prohibiting any subsequent tax legislation affecting the project, such as, e.g.. "The previous
taxpayment treatment, including rates, norms to determine the taxable income - and every
other pertinent provision, applicable unto the Investor will remain invariable during the term
of 30 years, as from the starting date of the commercial operation" (Chile-Noranda Mines Lt.
agreement of 1977, Art. (q) see also the Haiti/HIDECA agreement of 1976: "Limite de Taxa-
tion" Les montant pay6s a l'etat suivant ['article XIX, tiendront lieu et place de tout revenue,
cotisation, impositions sur les paiement de toutes les distributions due revenue ou du profit net,
(Art. XX).
3) The most glaring example of a complete and all-comprehensive stabilization clause
can be found in Art. 44 of the 1972 Botswana/Bamangwato Concessions Ltd. (Sashe) agree-
ment, which reads as follows:
(a) Provided, however, that the enactment of any amendments to existing laws or
regulations or the enactment of any new laws or regulations applicable to the Com-
pany or BRST or BCL Sales or any of their shareholders shall constitute a breach by
Government of this Master Agreement in the event that:
The application of such laws or regulations to the Company, BRST or BCL Sales or any
of their shareholders (either alone or taken together with the prior applications to the
Company, BRST or BCL Sales or to any of their shareholders of such laws or regulations
on a cumulative basis) has or would have a materially adverse effect on the net income or
financial position of the Company, BRST or BCL Sales or a financially materially adverse
effect on the rights and obligations of their shareholders under the law of Botswana ex-
isting as at the date hereof.
15. Published in 104 Clunet Journal du Droit International 350 (1977); see also supra note
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titled, by virtue of its supreme sovereign power, to change uni-
laterally the conditions of an agreement. In recent times, they have relied
particularly on the UN resolutions concerning the NIEO and Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources. 6
In view of the controversies, a consensus on the state of law applicable
can not be said to exist. However, the consequences of two alternatives may
be outlined:
(1) If the agreement should be considered - or stipulated - to be sub-
ject to the municipal law of the host state, 7 then principles of international
law can not be invoked. The question of renegotiability lies exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the host state's legal system. The only issue even-
tually open to international law is whether certain renegotiations constitute
"creeping nationalization" and warrant some measure of compensation."6
(2) If the agreement should be considered subject to international law,
one has to find principles of international law applicable to state contracts
with private companies. The "internationalization" of investment agree-
ments is not an unavoidable and necessary consequence of stipulations call-
ing for the application of a not exclusively national system of law. Such
stipulations might be considered invalidated by the recent UN resolutions,
particularly when negotiated in a situation of unequal bargaining power.
But even if recourse is sought from international law, an absolute "sanctity"
16. See Mikdashi, supra note 7; Mughraby, Permanent Sovereignty over Oil Resources
174 (1965), Schachter, supra note 7; Suratgar, Considerations Affecting Choice of Law Clauses in
Contracts Between Governments and Foreign Nationals, 2 Indian J. Int'l L.273 (1962); Rouhani,
supra note 7; Toriguian, supra note 7; EI-Kosheiri, Stabilit6 et 6volution dans les techniques
juridiques utilis6es par les pay en voie d'industrialisation, in Le Contrat Economique
International-Stabilite et Evolution (1975).
Insofar as authors consider investment agreements subject only to the municipal law of the
host country, the consequence of such view is the legitimacy of legislation altering the condi-
tions of the investment; see Nwogugu, The Legal Problems of Foreign Investment in Develop-
ing Countries 186 (1965); Date-Bah, The Legal Regime of Transnational Investment Agreements.
15 J. African L. 241 (1971); Ssekandi, Contracts Between a State and a Foreign Private Com-
pany, 2 E. African L.J. 281 (1966).
17. From the survey of recent investment agreements in petroleum and non-fuel minerals,
it can be stated that a visible trend toward stipulation of exclusive application of municipal law
exists. Apart from the Calvo-tradition in Latin American countries (in spite of some remarks to
the contrary in general observed), there will be scarcely any recent petroleum agreement in one
of the major producing countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Algeria, Libya) which does not provide
for exclusive national jurisdiction. Modern types of agreements, management, technical
assistance, and long-term marketing and purchase agreements, lend themselves much less to the
traditional application of international principles as does the classical concession.
18. But even then, international law can only be invoked by the home state of the TNC
which claims compensation to the company as its own right under international law, provided
no valid arbitration clause exists. It is interesting to note that the U.S. foreign investment in-
surance agency, OPIC, views the 1974 Jamaican bauxite levy as a legitimate exercise of
sovereignty and not as a "creeping" nationalization. See information on the OPIC brief in the
Revere Copper Case, Wall Street Journal, July 15, 1977.
According to an OPIC press release (without date, by Carl Middleton, OPIC director for
Minerals and Energy) on the OPIC energy program, OPIC intends to widen its insurance
program in order to cover essential provisions of investment agreements against legislative
abrogation or forced renegotiation.
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of contract, comparable to absolute immutability for the generally very long
duration, is unknown. The principle of the clausula rebus sic stantibus,
recognized in international law, is a basis for eventual adjustment and even
termination of the agreement in case of a change of the fundamental condi-
tions on which the agreement was based." The clausula rebus sic stantibus
principle has to be interpreted in light of pertinent UN resolutions,
reflecting the consensus of at least the capital-importing countries, on the
territory of which the investment is undertaken. Thus, a far reaching change
in the price of commodities, or an innovative change of contractual terms in
comparable arrangements, would grant to the host state, and to the TNC,
the right to require renegotiation for adjustment. It may be mentioned that
TNC's very often have successfully insisted on such clauses granting them-
selves an exclusive right of unilateral revision.
Insofar as international law does not yield principles of sufficient
clarity, a synoptic view of major legal systems, with a growing emphasis on
the legal principles emanating from the United Nations and other sources of
"international law of development,"20 is necessary to derive rules able to
contribute towards an emerging transnational law of investment agree-
ments.2" Such a survey shows that a change of the essential conditions on
which an agreement was based can give rise in major legal systems to a right
of readjustment, sometimes even of termination, under such legal concepts
and principles as "frustration," "impr~vision," "contrat administratif," or
"Geschaftsgrundage." 22 Attention must also be paid to judicial readjust-
ment or termination of agreements of unduly long duration or which re-
19. For the scope ofclausula rebus sic stantibus in international law and its applicability to
investment contracts, see Geiger, supra note 11; and Mughraby, supra note 16. For a discussion
of the scope of the clausula rebus sic stantibus relating to petroleum concession agreements see
Mulack, supra note II, at 221.
The OPEC resolution XVI 90, supra note 3. also relies upon the concept of changed cir-
cumstances to justify a revision.
The doctrine of "changed circumstances," i.e., rebus sic stantibus, has been invoked to
justify a revision of petroleum concessions by advocates of an exclusive application of natural
law. See generally Rouhani, supra note 7, at 272; Zakharya, Impact of Changing Circumstances
on the Revision of Petroleum Contracts, 37 Middle East Economic Survey (Suppl. 1969). It is in-
teresting to note that even as strong a critic of renegotiation as Legoux recognizes as obvious
that investment agreements are only "valid rebus sic siantibus". Legous, supra note 2, at 86.
The application of the clausula rebus sic stantibus as an inherent provision of investment
agreements is most forcefully stated by a resolution of the Argentine Democratic Lawyer's
Association (Ninth AIJD Congress, July 1970). It is postulated, inter alia. that economic in-
dependance constitutes ius cogens of international law and that agreements waiving such a right
of a sovereign state should be considered void.
20. EI-Kosheiri, supra note 13, at 285; Schachter, The Evolving International Law of
Development, 15 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 1, 8 (1976).
21. "[Tlransnational law ... include[s] all law which regulates actions or events that
transcend national frontiers. Both public and private international law are included, as are
other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories." Jessup, Transnational Law,
in the Storrs Lectures (1956). The emergence of transnational law is recognized by many
authors though its content is very controversial, see. e.g., Lalive, supra note I.
22..See Geiger, supra note 11.
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flect highly unequal bargaining power and experience.2" Such principles are
invoked in major legal systems particularly when the sovereign rights of the
government collide with its contractual obligations.24 From the principles of
major legal systems, interpreted in light of pertinent resolutions of the
United Nations and specific requirements of law adequate for an "economic
development agreement," one may conclude that following a
substantial change of the major conditions underlying the agreement, a revi-
sion of the terms is justified. Such a right of revision could not be excluded
by "stabilization" clauses,25 provisions in investment agreements reflecting
a major bargaining weakness of developing host countries vis-a-vis TNC's.
In sum, as far as basic legal concepts of international and domestic laws
are concerned, the view of absolute "sanctity" of contracts can hardly be
sustained. Renegotiation and readjustment can be justified by a change of
the crucial conditions underlying an agreement. In natural resources con-
tracts, with very long duration and substantial instability of the circumstan-
tial conditions, there is, accordingly, large room for claims for renegotia-
tion. In addition, one should consider the impracticability of tying the hands
of a developing country, in a period of fast and intensive transition, in a way
no developed state would permit.
However, as the situation giving rise to legitimate renegotiation is dif-
ficult to define precisely, and as the development of standards to readjust
the contract has not advanced very far in substance and in consensus, the
stipulation of precise conditions, procedures, and criteria for renegotiation
may be preferable to a reliance on controversial and rather vague principles.
23. See Geiger, supra note 11; Mulack. id. at 23. For agreements negotiated in colonial
times, now dying out slowly, the applications of the principles of duress might also be con-
sidered.
24. See Geiger. supra note 11, reports the parallel rights of the United States and French
governments to change government contracts and administrative concessions, id. at 364. The
distinction made by the sole arbitrator in Texaco v. Libya. supra note ., between the French
type, "contrat administratir' and the oil concession, the prototype' of government contract
yielding public rights to the concessionaire, does not appear convincing. Most legal systems of
administrative laws contain principles allowing the state to revoke, or to alter, government con-
tracts or administrative concessions, sometimes without, often with, the obligation to compen-
sate. The fact that TNC's have, in developing countries, often achieved the contractual form for
administrative concessions reflects their superior bargaining power, but should not prevent
reliance of principles developed from a comparison of administrative laws. As far as economic
facts are concerned, the administrative concession for petroleum development in a developed
Western country does differ little from a contractual petroleum concession in a developing
country.
25. To this conclusion may be added the argument that no sovereign state can bind itself
to an agreement with a TNC not to alter its present legislation for very long durations. Ac-
cording to this view, the frequent practice of inserting "stabilization clauses", freezing the
terms of the agreement and the accompanying legislation may be of no effect. See Brown,
Choice of Law Provisions in Concession and Related Contracts, 39 Mod. L.Rev. 6 (1976): Geiger
supra note 11, at 23; Suratgar, supra note 16, at 305.
This is very definitely the uncompromising position of the Argentinian Democratic
Lawyer's Association as of 1970, see note 19 supra. Traditional international law will probably
regard stabilization clauses as unconditionally binding. See Weil, Les clauses destabilization on
d'intangibiliik ins r4es dans les accord de dtveloppment iconomique, in M61anges offerts a
Charles Rousseau 301, 323 (1974).
REVISION OF AGREEMENTS
Of considerable interest in this context are procedures followed in certain
developed countries to revise government contracts; such laws and regula-
tions - particularly in the U.S. Renegotiation Act and the U.S. Armed Ser-
vices Procurement Regulations26 - provide for detailed definitions, criteria,
and procedures to revise prevailing terms.
IV. ACTUAL PRACTICES OF RENEGOTIATION
IN NATURAL RESOURCES CONTRACTS
It is not always easy to distinguish renegotiation from nationalization.
This difficulty is apparent, particularly in cases where the host country
forces the investor to agree to a partial or complete take-over and to con-
tinue some or all operations under revised terms. There is a shading from
the use of negotiating power to the coercive imposition of new conditions
upon a TNC, which is locked into a situation based on past investments
made on different terms.2 7 However, renegotiation can be distinguished by
the fact that revised terms are embodied in an agreement which constitutes
some form of continuation of the TNC's operations.
An obstacle to the precise reporting of the frequency and scope of cases
of renegotiation is the fact that, contrary to outright nationalization (which
is generally well reported),2" renegotiations, being subtler forms of revision
of investment conditions, are far less visible and thus less well documented.
Renegotiations frequently overlap with a change in the host state's invest-
ment conditions; a change in laws or regulations may also be in substance
identical with an intended or already concluded renegotiation with the
TNC's to be affected by the new terms. Most major cases of renegotiations
surveyed are accompanied or preceded by major changes in the investment
and tax regulations of the host country:29
Jamaica: 1974 Production Levy Act, 1976/77 renegotiation of
bauxite agreement;
Algeria: Petroleum Act of 1971, accompanying renegotiations
with CFP, ERAP;
Iran: Petroleum Act of 1974: follows the Consortium Sales and
Purchase Agreement of 1973 and accompanies the service con-
tracts of 1974;
Venezuela: Petroleum Law of 1975 (PIW, Sept. 8, 1975),
preceding various service investments;
Indonesia: Production Sharing Agreements, Work Contract,
and Excessive Profits Tax of 1975.
26. The U.S, Renegotiation Act, supra note 3, has been repealed since 1977. The U.S.
Armed Service Procurement Regulations, id. which are published continuously by the Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., contain provisions relating to the elimination of
excess profits and renegotiation.
27. See Hawkins, Mintz and Provissiero, Government Takeovers of U.S. Foreign Affiliates.
Int'l Bus 5 (1975); Vagts, 72 Am. J. Int'l L. 17 (1978).
28. See U.N.. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (A/9176). at 9; Sauvant &
Hasenpflug, supra note 5, at 378-79.
29. See Secretary General, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, U.N. Doe. E/C. 7/53
(1975) [hereinafter U.N. Permanent Sovereignty]; Brasseur, 5 International Legislation and
Fiscality of Hydrocarbons 37 (1976); Girvan, Corporate Imperialsim 98 (1977).
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Generally, one can find a tendency away from outright nationalization
toward renegotiated and gradual take-overs, whether in the area of
petroleum concessions or that of non-fuel minerals and other natural
resources (timber, rubber).30 Few major contracts ever survive unaffected
under the initial conditions until their stipulated termination." Major
nationalizations appear in times of high political conflict and visibility, 2 but
most changes in the "rules of the game" come about by less visible
renegotiations; this is particularly so, as a survey of 170 cases of take-over of
U.S. subsidiaries reveals,33 in the area of natural resources. The revision of
terms may start with a unilateral act of the host country (Jamaica 1974), but
in most cases the mere possibility of such action is an important bargaining
lever of the host country in inducing a TNC to renegotiate.3" A survey of 50
major investment agreements (petroleum, non-fuel minerals, rubber) 5
shows that most major agreements in petroleum and bauxite have experi-
enced substantial revisions between 1968 and 1976, due to producers
associations (OPEC, I.B.A.); but also, in copper, diamonds, iron, rubber,
and phosphate, renegotiation appears to be more the rule than the excep-
tion. Renegotiation has the advantage of eliminating a number of obstacles
host countries have encountered after nationalizations, such as problems in
operations, in expansion of existing facilities, in marketing, and financ-
ing.36  Renegotiations encompassing a substantial revision have in-
itially concentrated in the area of petroleum, but the signals emitted by the
strong petroleum producing countries have since been followed by weaker
petroleum producers and by host states producing non-fuel minerals.37 It is
interesting to note that previously existing joint-venture and service con-
tracts in petroleum have, to a large extent, been unmodified by renegotia-
tion insofar as the host state's participation and control were concerned."6
Such relative immunity to the storms of change experienced in the
30. U.N. Permanent Sovereignty, supra note 26, at 30; Rouhani. supra note 7. at 273. This
development reflects the policy enunciated by OPEC Resolution XVI. 90. supra note 3. which
calls for renegotiation to revise concession with unilateral action reserved for the case of the
company's non compliance. A survey of 170 takeovers of U.S. subsidiaries reveals that
renegotiation has been increasingly important as compared to nationalization. Hawkins. Mintz
and Provisiero, supra note 27.
31. Smith and Wells, supra note 9, at 151.
32. See Girvan, supra note 29, at 52; Moran, The Multinational Corporation and the
Politics of Dependance 57 (1974).
33. See Hawkins et al., supra note 27.
34. See Bostock & Harvey, Economic Independence and Zambian Copper (1972); Zoen,
U.N. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs Workshop in New Delhi, (1975) (Mimeograph).
35. The survey is based upon several case studies and the following trade journals:
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, Middle East Economic Survey, Oil and Gas Journal, Mining
and Engineering Journal and others. For a compilation of changes in government participa-
tion. see Johnson Messick, Vertical Divestiture of U.S. Oil Firms. 8 L.Poly. Int'l Bus. 963-968.
36. Such obstacles have been encountered by host countries, particularly in Peru (Mar-
cona), Bolivia (Patino), Chile (Kennecott/Anaconda). For an extensive analysis, see Moran,
supra note 32.
37. In particular, the renegotiation of bauxite agreements in the Caribbean. For a history
of these negotiations, see Girvan, supra note 29, at 98. For an analysis of the fiscal provisions,
see McCalla, Taxation of Bauxite Resources: The Jamaican Model. 5 Black L.J. 280 (1977).
38. Zakharia, New Directions in the Search for a Development of Petroleum Resources in
the Developing Countries. 9 Vand. J. Transnt'l L. 545, 572 (1976).
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traditional concessions suggests that companies who opted for more flexible
agreements and conceded a larger share of partnership and control to the
host state, were able to achieve a higher degree of stability in their contrac-
tual terms.
Insofar as the outcome and the scope of the various waves of renegotia-
tions in recent years are concerned, the most salient feature is the main-
tenance of the role of the TNC as large scale consumer of output and as a
supplier of technical services. The corresponding long-term purchase,
marketing, and technical assistance agreements, provide generally for a con-
siderably shorter duration of 2-12 years than did the original concessions of
25-50 years. Some of these new post-nationalization agreements known to
the author appear to offer rather generous conditions to the TNC, as far as
compensation for technical services (based on the volume of production) are
concerned, without obliging the TNC to guarantee the performance of the
services and the advice rendered.
With regard to petroleum, the most salient features of recent renegotia-
tions have been the participation of the host state, the multiple rise of the
posted price, a rise of royalty and tax rates, the elimination of certain
rebates, and the imposition of excess profits taxes. Obligations following the
trend of modern investment agreements concerning local employment and
downstream integration (processing, shipping, marketing) have been in-
serted. Newly created companies share increasingly in the control of the ex-
tracting and later, the down-stream operating ventures. Another trend in
renegotiated agreements is the increasing subjection to national laws of
general application, reducing the traditional enclave status of the
foreign investment in favor of modern types of investment regimes. Com-
panies, on the other hand, have increasingly taken to sophisticated forms of
non-equity control, such as management and long-term purchase and
marketing arrangements, thus retaining material control in spite of sub-
mitting to complete national ownership. A specific feature of the bauxite
renegotiations (1974-1977) is the establishment of a royalty-type fiscal in-
strument ("income tax," "production levy"), calculating taxable income on
final metal prices, thus avoiding the shortcomings of intra-enterprise trade.
The result of recent renegotiations is the development of more sophisticated
forms of agreements, bringing older concession models in line with the
modern evolution of the transnational investment agreement. Renegotiation
is not an exception, but rather a main feature of modern, large scale, and
long-term investment contracts. Renegotiation is certainly not confined to
TNC-host country relations. Japanese companies have been known to de-
mand renegotiation of long-term supply contracts when economic forecasts
requiring the supplies proved wrong; such action reflects to some degree an
Asian concept of contract more as a declaration of intent than as a definite
obligation covered by the sanctity of contract. Commodities-supply con-
tracts quite frequently include a clause calling for renegotiation, if currency
fluctuations exceed a stipulated ceiling, if extreme changes of commodities
prices occur, or if radical shifts in long-term commodities markets take
place. The on-going process of renegotiation reflects the requirements of
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long-term stability and flexibility. It is, on the micro-economic scale of in-
dividual agreements, an element in the continuous process of adjustment
and evolution the world economic system is experiencing at present on a
macro-scale.
Table I: Illustrative Cases of Renegotiation
in the Petroleum Sector
Country TNC Year Result
Algeria Getty Oil 1968 51% Sontratrach-participation
Algeria CFP/ERAP 1971 51% Sontratrach-participation
(1971: Petroleum majority Code: State participation obligatory, state
company Sontratrach as holder of concession/licenses)
Algeria ERAP 1975 100% state ownership, severing of
relations
Algeria CFP 1975 51% state participation, renewed
contract until 1980
SaudiArabia ARAMCO 1974 60% Saudi Arabian participation
for ARAMCO: long-term sup-
ply, TA-contract
SaudiArabia ARAMCO 1976 100% state ownership
maintain ARAMCO as operating entity [service contract]
Ecuador Texaco-Gulf (et al.) 1973/74 25% participation by CEPE (State
company)
Ecuador Texaco-Gulf (et al.) 1977 100% state participation
UnitedEmirates Abu Dhabi Oil Company 1974 60% state participation
UnitedEmirates Abu Dhabi Oil Company 1976 100% state ownership of all gas
both associated and non-
associated, formalized by decree
Kuwait Kuwait Oil Company 1972 25% state participation
Kuwait Kuwait Oil Company 1974 60% state participation
Kuwait BP/Gulf 1975 supply contract (5 years) for TNC
100% state ownership
100% state takeover
Quatar QGPC, QPC et al 1974 60% state participation





CPF, Standard Oil of
Cal. et al.)
1973 Consortium agreement of 1954
abrogated. Full management
and control taken over by NI
Sales and Purchase Agreement
with Consortium (5 years)
Colombia 1975 Concessions cancelled. Renegotia-
tion into Association and Ser-
vice Contracts
Indonesia 1974 Excess profits tax for Contractors
of PERTAMINA (by statute
and renegotiation)
Venezuela 1975 take-over of oil companies,
replacement by oil sales agree-
ments (2-years. renewable). TA-
agreements (3 years)
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Exxon et al. 1973/74 51% participation
1977 100% state ownership
Shell/BP 1973 participation schedule:





Table II: Illustrative Cases of Renegotiation
in the Non-Fuel Mineral Sector
Country TNC


























1974 Excess profits tax (sliding tax) and
other tax changes, expected to
produce additional revenues of
ca. 40 Mio. AS p/a above 1967
agreement. Mutual review of
agreement all 7 years other ad-
justment provisions
1969 51% state participation, manage-
ment and sales contract for
TNC's
1974 Increase of national control over
management via the newly
created state company
1973/77 Sub. increase of rates for use of
power
1974 Negotiated take-over followed by
management agreement with
other US company
1974/75 Reduction of tax holidays
1975 Negotiated take-over of Chromite
industry
1972 Negotiated take-over of the Cerro
de Pasco Copper Corporation
1974 Increase in use of company's
transportation system, localiza-
tion of employment, minor in-
crease of fiscal revenues
1975 Payments for deferral of exploita-
tion liability to taxes of general
application
1974 Minor increase in revenue.
stronger provisions in localiza-
tion, creation of technical com-
mittee to increase national con-
trol
1976 Subjection to general laws. moder-
nization of agreement, increase
in revenue
1974 50% government participation, in-
crease of tax receipts
1974 partial/complete take-over,
marketing arrangements, entry
of Japanese trading companies
Libya
Nigeria
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The renegotiation of four major agreements in Liberia (LAMCO,
LISCO, Bong, and Firestone) is rather well documented. It reflects a con-
tinuous change, even of a minor scope and weight in most provisions, par-
ticularly as far as the objectives of the Liberian government in adjusting the
concessionary terms to the conditions in more advanced countries are con-
cerned. Between 1960 and 1977, at least four renegotiations have taken place
in those agreements, slowly and gradually modifying the terms within the
framework of the basic concessions. Renegotiation, well documented here,
is not an exception but rather a main feature of modern, large-scale, and
long-term investment contracts in natural resources. The renegotiation pat-
tern and the results reflect the sophistication that the host country achieves
in learning the basic abilities of exercising control over its natural resources.
Country TNC Year Result
Jamaica Kaiser, Reynolds, 1974/
ALCOA, ALCAN 76/77 Super-royalty: Imposition of a tax
(heads of based on a percentage of the
Agreements/Final final ingot price (7.5% to 8.5%)
Agreements) 51% participation of Jamaica
Programme to increase process-
ing of bauxite into Alumina in
Jamaica. Revenue increased
from 1973 to 1974: from 25 Mio.
US$ to 160 Mio. US$. From
TNC's: Long-term supply agree-
ment (40 years); 7 years manage-
ment contracts.
(Total take per ton: from US$
2.8 to US$ 12)
Surinam ALCOA 1974 6% levy on bauxite, based on final
ingot price, increase in revenues:
from ca. 18 Mio. US$ to ca. 45
Mio. US$ (take per ton: S11)
Haiti Reynolds 1974 7.5% bauxite levy, based on final
ingot price, increase in revenues:
ca. 2 Mio. US$ to 11 Mio. USS
(total take per ton: from $1.88 to
$11)
Sierra Leone Rutile Ltd 1975 47% equity-purchase option for
government by 8th year of
production at book value
Zaire Union Mini~re 1967 100% government ownership
(GECAMINES) Management
Contract for 25 years, compen-
sation: 6% of export sales.
Sources: The illustrative cases of renegotiations have been compiled from: Permanent
Sovereignty, U.N. Doc. E/C. 7/53; A/9716 and E/C. 7/66; from Brasseur, Inter-
national Legislation and Fiscality of Hydrocarbons, 13ff ( 1976); Zakahariya, 9 Vand.
J. Transnat'l L. 545 (1976); from sources such as the Petroleum Intelligence Weekly
(P1W), the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), the Oil and Gas Journal, and the
Latin American Economic Report. Other sources used are: T. Turner, Oil and
Government in Nigeria (1977) (Ph.D. thesis at London School of Economics); Smith
& Wells, at 15ff; Negotiating Third World Mineral Agreements, (1975); Radmann,
Nationalizations in Bolivia (Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee) at 277 (1972); Clower,
Growth without Development (1966); Coale, German Transnationals in Tropical
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Africa (1977) (Ph.D. thesis at Boston University). Renegotiations have also been
reported in the Far Eastern Economic Review and the New African. Case studies
reviewed by Thomas Walde. Lifting the Veil from Transnational Mineral Contracts, I
Nat. Resources F. 277 (1977); see also Girvan, Corporate Imperialism and Garrity,
The Multinational Corporation in Extractive Industries; A Case Study of Reynolds
Haitian Mines, in Yale Antilles Program-Working Papers in Haitian Society and
Culture, at 183ff(1975) - contains references to the history of individual concession
regimes.
V. THE EVOLUTION OF CONTRACTUAL FLEXIBILITY
1. Duration of Contracts
Traditional petroleum concessions in the Middle East often had a dura-
tion of up to 99 years." With the course of time, world market conditions
have changed, generally favoring the TNC. New arrangements have evolved
which have made the older concessions appear outdated and disadvan-
tageous to the host country. Finally, host countries became increasingly
aware of the capacities of the concessionaries to contribute in various ways
to new development objectives. Accordingly, in addition to the wave of
nationalizations and renegotiations, host countries have, with growing
emphasis, insisted on a curtailment in the duration of the agreement and
particularly have insisted on various contractual instruments to increase the
flexibility of the contractual regime to adjust to the changing basic cir-
cumstances of the mining project. Such a development, which may be called
a "dynamization" of the cornerstones of the agreement, such as the distribu-
tion of management and control, of marketing and production, of fiscal
revenue systems, and of employment provisions, has come about oc-
casionally with the willing consent of the investor: Sophisticated company
negotiators increasingly realize that contractual flexibility is an instrument
which can channel necessarily arising conflicts and demands for a revision
of contractual terms, thereby avoiding radical measures such as complete
take-overs, which cut off the TNC from its raw materials source and the
host country from its marketing and financing connections."0
In response to these developments and developing countries demands
in negotiations, agreements with TNC's in natural resources provide for an
increasingly shorter period of time. In non-fuel mining, a modern agreement
may have a duration of 25-35 years, depending upon whether the start of the
period is the date of conclusion of the contract or the start of commercial
production. In petroleum, the duration may even be considerably
39. The average duration was fifty through seventy years, see Fischer, Die Internationale
Konzession 400 (1974); Sarre, Arbitration Clauses in the Oil Industry in the Middle East, in In-
ternational Commercial Arbitration 336 (1974). The TPC concession of 1925, Iraq-Turkish
Petroleum Co., see test in Hurewitz, 2 Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East 131 (provided
for a seventy-five year duration); The A.R.A.M.C.O. concession of 1933, Saudi Arabia-
S.C.C.A.L. I PLME A-I, for sixty years; The Quatar-APOC agreement of 1935, see Quatar v.
Rules of Quatar, 18 ILR, 161 (195 1), and the Abu Dhabi-A.D.P.C., see Development v. Sheik
of Abu Dhabi, 18 I.L.R. 144 (1951), for seventy-five years each. The Firestone rubber conces-
sion of 1928 in Liberia may have been rather typical with its ninety-nine year duration.
40. See Wells, Negotiating with Third World Governments, 55 Harv. Bus. Rev. 72 (1977).
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shorter.4 1 Such a distinction may often stem from the fact that the lead time,
that is the time between start of exploration until repayment of initial invest-
ment by production, is considerably longer in non-fuel than in petroleum
mining. However, attention should be paid to the fact that the stipulated
duration of the contract is often considerably lengthened because it only
runs from the start of commercial production. As long as no precise and en-
forced time limits are placed as a timetable for exploration, feasibility study,
construction, and production, the TNC will often foreclose the mine site to
competitors without actually speeding up commercial exploitation."2 The
duration of an agreement tends to shorten considerably once a fullfledged
concession contract is substituted by modern types of agreements, thereby
shifting the risk and responsibility, in various scales, from the TNC to the
host country: Time periods of 4 and 10 years can be observed in manage-
ment, service, and technical assistance contracts. If such agreements are
concluded after a national takeover, the long-term supply contracts with
TNC's after nationalization will cover considerably less time than
traditional concessions; time periods of 2, 3, or 5 years, often coupled with
more flexible stipulations of extension and renewability, are not unusual.
Duration will often hinge on the expected depletion of the mine; hence,
TNC's will prefer a duration which corresponds to the prospective opera-
tion period of the site. In order to enhance contractual flexibility, host coun-
tries increasingly insist on durations shorter than prospective exploitation
periods and will try to make exploitation of adjacent mine sites dependent
on a complete or partial renegotiation of the previous agreement. Also,
precise timetables are set for the various stages of development. Rights for
renewal are coupled with a complete or partial revision of the terms.
41. This observation is based on a survey of 157 recent agreements. The survey shows that
in non-fuel contracts concluded between 1971 and 1977, twenty-one through twenty-five dura-
tions are the most frequent, while in petroleum agreements a strong minority (nine as against
fourteen) of the contracts provide for ten years as opposed to twenty-six through thirty years.
42. Another element which may prolong the stipulated duration is the provision allowing
the TNC to ask for a renewal, for ten through twenty-five years, upon the same conditions.
These renewal rights create what appears to be a short duration but which actually is not, In re-
cent agreements, however, renewal rights are generally made subject to a right of renegotiation
of the major terms of the agreements, compare, e.g.. the Sierra Leone/A.F.A.G. bauxite agree-
ment (1961), section four, which reads:
Upon written application the Company, not later than six months prior to the ex-
piration of the License, the Government shall grant renewal of the License for a
further period of five years upon the same conditions, provided that the Company is
not then in default under any of the terms and conditions of the License or of this
agreement, but the said renewal ... will not be granted unless the Company has ap-
plied for, and been granted a mining lease under clause five of the agreement and has
started the production and export of bauxite in commercial quantities.
The above being a relatively short renewal condition upon the performance of the investor: with
the Indonesia-Rio Tinto Zinc agreement (1977) section twenty-nine which reads-
Subject to the provisions herein contained, the Agreement shall continue in force
until the expiration of the Last Operating Period . . . the government agrees that
within a reasonable period prior to the expiration of the Operating Period for any
Mining Area it will give sympathetic consideration to any request by the Company to
extend the Operating Period in question in recognition of the requirements for the ap-
propriate economic recovery of Minerals from any such area.
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TABLE III
A. Duration: Non-Fuel Mineral Contracts
1-10(yrs.) 11-45 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-40
1950-1960 - - - - 6 -
1961-70 1 4 1 6 15 1
1971-1977 5 2 4 14 2 1
TOTAL 6 6 5 20 23 2
(TOTAL: 73)
B. Duration: Petroleum Contracts
5-9 (yrs.) 10-20 21-25 26-30 31-40 over 40 Total
1950-60 - - 1 - - - 1
1961-70 - 2 7 30 3 3 45
1971-77 - 9 3 14 - 2 28
TOTAL - 11 11 44 3 5 74
(TOTAL: 74)
2. Contractual and Legislative Instrument to Increase Contractual Flexibility
Due to the long duration of contracts and the corresponding high oc-
currence of unforeseen events, and to the unequal balance in the distribution
of benefits and consequent conflicts, agreements increasingly provide for
various instruments to augment the agreement's ability to sail safely
through the storms of change. Perhaps three main approaches can be dis-
tinguished to facilitate the contractual revision of terms and conditions:
(a) Provisions providing for a procedure of renegotiation of the whole
agreement triggered by the lapse of a period of time or by certain
more or less clearly defined events;
(b) provisions providing for renegotiation, triggered by lapse of a time
period or by certain events, of specific clauses of the agreement,
generally the cornerstones of the fiscal regime (tax and royalty
rates), or of the contractual regime relating to the pricing of
minerals.
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(c) provisions stipulating automatic adjustment or change of cor-
nerstone clauses of the agreement, such as a tax rate, increasing
over time or at certain specified events, relinquishment of the con-
cession areas, change and adjustment of royalty rates, most-favored
clauses, and divestment. Occasionally, the automaticity of such a
revision will not function as contemplated but will require detailed
renegotiation. Automatic revision clauses may therefore function
by triggering oveall renegotiation.
3. Renegotiation
In mineral contracts before 1970, renegotiation clauses in favor of the
host country could only be found rarely. They generally covered issues such
as readjustment of royalties, or of pricing arrangements following a change
of world market conditions. Such provisions generally entitled the TNC as
well as the host country to renegotiate. TNC's, on the other hand, were en-
titled frequently to a revision of the contractual regime, triggered by most
favored clauses. Most investment agreements in francophonic Africa con-
tain such provisions. However, in recent agreements, a visible surge of
renegotiation provisions can be observed. The provisions cover topics rang-
ing from the stipulation of periodic renegotiation of the agreement to the
stipulation of the renegotiation of specific clauses triggered by precisely
defined events. An analysis of 104 large scale investment contracts
(petroleum, non-fuel minerals, other natural resources) shows that while
from 1967-1973, of 68 contracts, only 6 provided for specific or general
renegotiation, 12 agreements out of 36 concluded between 1974 and 1977
contained renegotiation clauses. Even in these recent agreements, renegotia-
tion is often severely limited. It is conditioned upon the lapse of seven to
thirteen years after commercial production, and in two agreements, upon
the occurrence of "profound change in circumstances" of the original agree-
ment. Such a revision by renegotiation is hardly revolutionary. It embodies
traditional Western concepts of the "Geschaftsgrundlage, "the clausula rebus
sic stantibus and "frustration," 43 and even limits the scope and ap-
plicability of such principles. Such restricted renegotiation clauses may be
far away from actually inserting flexibility into the contractual regime, com-
pared to other instruments of flexibility which they restrict. Yet, seen from
an evolutionary perspective, they may be justified as a primary instrument
in a relatively weak host-country's achieving an increasing degree of
sovereignty over its natural resources.
43. For a discussion of termination, revision, and adjustment of contractual obligation
under these concepts, see Geiger, supra note 11; Mughraby, supra note 4. These principles can
generally be involved without the requirement of a lapse of certain time period. The clauses
mentioned restrict accordingly, the scope of such principles, It is questionable whether these
restrictions can be considered valid once a change in certain circumstances (profitability, costs,
comparable terms, competitiveness) has taken place, see. e.g., the Liberia- Firestone Rubber
Agreement (1976) section twenty-nine which reads:
For the purpose of considering profound changes in circumstances from those ex-
isting on the Effective Date or on the date of most recent review of this agreement, at
the request of either party, consult together. In case such profound changes are es-
tablished to have occurred, the parties shall effect such changes in, or clarification of,
these agreements that they agree are necessary.
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As far as the evolution of such general renegotiation provisions is con-
cerned, one may expect that they embody traditional concepts of the
clausula rebus sic stantibus with an increasing precision with respect to the
conditions, the standards, and procedure of renegotiation. Evolving further,
they may free themselves from these traditional legal concepts and provide
for periodic renegotiation, or renegotiation conditioned upon precisely
defined events, with a precision approaching the automatic readjustment
provisions. Issues to be dealt with in such modernized revision arrange-
ments could be:
(I) A precise definition of events triggering renegotiation, such as:
- a certain period of time (such as 5, 7, or 10 years) after start of
commercial production;
- a period of time until the initial investment plus an agreed upon
rate of return (internal, on equity/total investment) has been
recouped;
- a material change of fundamental circumstances (comparable
agreements, international codes, excessive profits, world
market price change, change of ownership and control of TNC,
change in home country legislation).44
(2) The scope of the renegotiation:
-covering the whole agreement;
-relating only to certain key provisions (taxation and fiscal
regime, pricing, employment, processing).
(3) The standards to be used by the parties, or a third-party, in
renegotiating, such as:
-fairness, (better to be defined as target rate of return, percentage
of division of costs and benefits);
-account of the risk taken or to be taken in the future;
44. The tax regulations of the TNC's home country have been singled out for particular
attention in this context, see, e.g., the Jamaica/ALCOA bauxite agreement (1976) § 8.02(h)
which reads-
Subject to the provisions of any Income Tax Treaty between Jamaica and the
United States which hereafter may be concluded and which includes provisions for
relief from double taxation, in the event of double taxation arising from actions by
Jamaica or the United States with respect to any of the matters covered by this Article
VIII of this 1976 Agreement then Alcoa may request a review and discussion of the
action giving rise to such double taxation and the Government shall take such
reasonable action as the parties thereto may deem proper and appropriate in the cir-
cumstances to endeavor to avoid or reduce such double taxation. Nothing contained
in this Subsection 8.02(h) shall expressly or by implication create any obligation on
the part of the Government to waive, reduce, or remit in whole or in part any tax
which Alcoa shall have paid or shall be liable to pay under this Article VIII of this
1976 Agreement.
See also the Jamaica/Reynolds bauxite agreement (1977) § 6.04 which deals with the
setting of the production levy on bauxite based on a percentage of the final aluminum ingot
price and which reads: "In the event of the imposition in the United States of price controls of
aluminum, either party may request review and discussion of the provisions of this article."
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-terms of parallel or more recent agreements, comparable to the
project at issue or of mining, tax, and investment legislation
comparable with the situation of the project at issue;
-elimination of excess profits, excess profits defined in precise
terms, using a target rate of return, the general level of net earn-
ings elsewhere in industry where similar circumstances occur,
the rate of return necessary to induce operators to undertake the
risk;4
-the economic feasibility of revised terms and the TNC's com-
petitive position;
-the standards set by international organizations and the relevant
producers association.
(4) The procedure of renegotiation and the consequences of the parties'
inability to reach an agreement:
Here, some institutionalized mechanism may be useful to over-
come the parties' inability to reach an agreement on their own. Such
a third-party decision may, even if rarely used, provide a strong in-
centive towards compromise; both parties may be very unwilling to
let a third-party decide on the content of a renegotiated agreement.
International and national dispute settlement institutions, decision
by one or three experts, ad-hoc arbitration, and finally, the setting-
up of a specialized renegotiation board (e.g. the United States
Renegotiating Act), may be considered. The more precise the stan-
dards and criteria are, the more both parties' readiness to stipulate a
renegotiation clause to reach an agreement and to submit to a third-
party decision will increase. The reason for such increased
willingness is the greater predictability of the financial conse-
quences.
As banks are becoming increasingly important in negotiations
and insist on the projects accelerated ability to pay back loans, any
renegotiation clause triggered by the completion of repayment of
loans will enhance the banks' willingness to accept such a provision.
It can be expected that renegotiation clauses of growing
sophistication, as outlined, will be more frequently used. However,
the more precise the standards to be used for renegotiation, the
more such clauses will overlap with automatic adjustment arrange-
ments.
45. These are the criteria set forth in OPEC Resolution XVI. 90, supra note 3. For
renegotiation, see also Renegotiation Act id.
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B. Renegotiation: Petroleum Contracts
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4. Automatic Adjustment and Revision of Contractual Arrangements
Automatic adjustment and revision clauses appear to be one of the ma-
jor new traits of mineral contracts between TNCs and host countries.
Automatic adjustment and revision can deal effectively with a number of the
problems outlined. However, it should not be forgotten that automatic revi-
sion of the cornerstones of a contract is negotiated generally at a time when
the TNC still holds the bargaining power superiority. Automatic revisions
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and of the control, ease otherwise escalating conflicts, At the same time,
such a provision accommodates the TNCs and the banks' strong interest in
predictable terms on which to base the very risky decision of committing
substantial amounts of investment capital. When the host country is at its
weakest level of bargaining power, automatic revision alone may not be suf-
ficient to maximize the host country's share of the benefits generated by the
project. Other measures to achieve this goal will be discussed under the
heading of "assurance of mining rights." Automatic revision must be seen
as one of a series of possible instruments in creating a workable arrange-
ment with investing TNCs in achieving national sovereignty.
The pertinent characteristic of automatic adjustment and revision is
that, from the onset of the investment, TNC and host country have agreed
on the changes in the contractual regime which will occur when certain
events happen or when a certain period of time has elapsed. As long as no
unforeseen and unconsidered events arise, the contract is able to adjust itself
to a range of possible, yet uncertain future events. By providing for sliding
scales of the government's revenue, the contract can generally provide a
continuing feeling of fairness on the part of the host country, without engen-
dering the conflicts arising under forced renegotiation or nationalization.
Thus, the excess profits tax levied in several recent contracts avoids the un-
avoidable outcry over exploitative behavior by the TNC in the host country.
Automatic adjustment and revision is particularly, but not exclusively,
stipulfited in the following areas:
-the contrac'tual regime concerning employment and economic
development of the host country (timetables for localization of em-
ployment and linkages);
-the size of the concessionary area;
-the fiscal regime of the contract (taxes, royalties, duties, fees);
-the division of equity between host country and TNC (disinvestment,
phase-out arrangements, buy-in options).
(a) Automatic Adjustment within the Fiscal Regime
Most provisions with an impact on the distribution of revenues bet-
ween TNC and host country (and sometimes home country) can be
stipulated so as to make them dynamic, i.e. they are able to adjust to events
or changes according to certain timetables. Only some major instruments of
such kind contained in recent agreements shall be outlined:
Royalties can be adjusted according to the development of world
market prices of minerals or processed metals (Jamaica). They can
be graduated so as to encourage productivity and can be made to
reflect the overall or average profitability of mining operations.
Some contracts contain a fixed component of royalty (to provide a
steady revenue) and a variable component (so as to allow the host
country to share in the economic risk and benefit of world market
price development).
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Income/Corporation taxes are stipulated in such a way that the
tax rate increases after certain absolute levels of profits have been
reached, after a stipulated (internal) rate of return (on equity/total
investment) has been reached, after the initial investment has been
recouped, and after elapse of periods of time (Papua-New Guinea,
Indonesia, Iran).
Accounting Practices are drafted so as to achieve a certain degree
of flexibility. In the initial production period until recoupment of
investment and repayment of loans, accelerated depreciation in-
creases the cash flow to the company. Similar effects can be
reached with a carry forward of losses within a certain time period.
Such accounting privileges will disappear gradually, increasing the
host country's share similar to progressive and sliding tax schemes.
Rentals (Deadrents, area fees) increase overtime so as to increase
the incentive for the TNC to relinquish areas. Such an incentive is
linked to the instrument of mandatory relinquishment to be dis-
cussed infra.
Service Fees, paid by the host country or the joint venture to the
TNC for rendering technical management services, decrease after a
certain time. Such decrease reflects the expectation of more ef-
ficient operation and provides an incentive for the TNC to train
the national management rapidly.
Profit-sharing Schemes, when coupled with disinvestment
(in fra), provide for a rising share of the host government's share of
total revenues generated by dividends on shares.
(b) Dynamic Employment and Economic Development Contractual
Agreements
As job creation and qualification, integration of the mining venture
into the national economy and other economic performance objectives gain
growing weight within the host country's negotiation goals, contractual flex-
ibility and dynamics are increasingly stipulated. In matters of employment,
timetables are established to increase the employment of nationals at
various levels up to top management. In matters of processing of minerals
extracted in order to increase national value added, timetables may be set.
In addition, contracts may provide incentives, specific work programs, or
even third party decisions to start and to increase the capacities for the
various stages of economically feasible local processing. Lastly, the grant of
renewal of the initial contract may be made subject to positive performance
insofar as local processing of extracted minerals is concerned.
(c) Reduction of the Mining Area
Stemming from petroleum practice, contracts increasingly provide for a
gradual relinquishment of the area allotted. After each stage (i.e. prospec-
tion, exploration, exploitation), or after certain periods of time, the operator
must relinquish a certain (often increasing) percentage of the concessionary
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area. Such a policy of gradual and progressive relinquishment induces active
exploration and exploitation. It can work against TNC's policies of preserv-
ing unexploited mining areas to foreclose competitors and it allows the host
state to exploit itself, or in combination with other companies, areas relin-
quished by the initial concessionaire. The setting aside of "national
reserves" taken from explored areas and reserved for exploitation by the
host country is another instrument. Such a national reserve can be used to
induce the TNC to offer better terms for its exploitation. Obligatory relin-
quishment, complemented by increasing land rentals, also has a function in
the context of the ongoing bargaining between TNC and host country. If ex-
ploitable mining areas have to be relinquished to the host state, the host
state can use its right to grant new concessions in that area to achieve better
terms from the initial operator or new entrants. For this purpose, in
Canada, a checkerboard system of concession area grants has been
developed,46 whereby after successful exploration and granting of a mining
concession, the mining area is divided in a checkerboard pattern, the various
blocks evenly divided between the state and the operator. According to such
a system, the operator is rewarded for his risky and successful exploration
and the state retains some leverage with its parts of the explored areas. A
similar system has been proposed for deep-seabed mining. 7 The reservation
of some part of the explored area to the state for later exploitation and
negotiation may accordingly increase the host state's leverage in later
negotiations and increase the flexibility of the contractual regime, without
creating conflicts over forced renegotiation."
(d) Disinvestment Provisions: Contractual Nationalization
An avenue to complete national sovereignty over natural resources of
increasing importance has become systematic, agreed-upon or legislatively
prescribed, disinvestment, also called "phase-out" or "fade-out. '4 9 Disin-
vestment means that, according to various forms, schedules, timetables, and
procedures, the investing TNC starts with a majority or with complete
ownership of the investment project. However, in the course of time of
following certain events, nationals of the host country, the government, or
particularly the state enterprise take over equity and control of the
46. See presentation by J. Ross Tolmie, Buenos Aires Workshop (1973) published as
Negotiation and Drafting of Mining Development Agreements (1976). A national reserve can be
used to induce the TNC to offer better, revised terms for its explitation while retaining suf-
ficient incentives for speculative explitation. For a system of national reserves, see generally
Codigo de Mineria 1975, art. 18 (Bolivia), Legislacion Minera. 1975. art. 71 (Mexico). The
relinquishment, or setting aside as national reserves, of successfully explored areas has been of
particular consequence with regard to petroleum development (witness a Venezuelan service
contract in which 80 percent of the discovered area was relinquished). In juxtaposition to the
Venezuelan contract, the IRAN-ERAP and the IRAQ-ERAP agreements of 1966 and 1968
provided that a part of the recoverable reserves were excluded from agreement area and were to
be treated as national reserves.
47. See United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Informal Composite
Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10 (1977) at 158.
48. Supra note 46.
49. See Hirschman, How to Divest in American, and Why (1969); Smith & Wells, supra
note 9, at 135; Mikdashi, supra note 7, at 162.
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operating company. Disinvestment takes place until a prescribed level of
national ownership or complete national ownership is reached.
Disinvestment is comparable to a joint-venture, differing only insofar
as the joining of the national entities will take place after the initial stage of
the investment. 0 It is comparable to nationalization, differing insofar as the
investor agrees to a normally gradual nationalization and to its conditions
and compensation. Disinvestment has been widely hailed as a major,
peaceful step towards national ownership and control and towards a de-
escalation of many investment disputes."s Indeed, once nationalization takes
place according to an agreed upon program, much pressure for forced
nationalization is eliminated. Host countries have often regarded disinvest-
ment as a means of achieving national control parallel to the host country's
learning process, enabling it to take effective control without deterring in-
vestors by affecting contracts through unilateral action.
In light of the above, a large number of investment laws prescribe or
provide incentives for gradual disinvestment by TNCs5 2
Natural resources, however, are often excluded from such statutory
divestment since special agreements tend to govern major large scale invest-
ment projects.5" Yet recently there has been a trend towards a relaxation of
disinvestment prescriptions in some countries.14 It has also been
found55 that merely providing some tax incentives does not induce TNCs to
major divestment strategies. Thus, the best source for the actual evolution of
divestment arrangements is found less in statutory disinvestment prescrip-
tions than in the history of contractual negotiations and in the contractual
documents themselves.
As for petroleum contracts, major petroleum producing countries have
started with the New York Agreement of 1972 to establish a timetable for
divestment, starting with an immediate state participation level of 25 per-
cent and rising in 1978 to a 51 percent majority. These divestment schemes,
however, have by now been passed over by the complete take-over of
petroleum TNCs' subsidiaries in the OPEC countries. 56
50. Divestment generally means the gradual increase of ownership by nationals (or
government entities) of the host country. It is closely related to an equity joint venture where
the ratio of equity holding is stipulated to be stable and is accompanied by provisions providing
for options of the host country to buy into the operating company or to participate in any in-
crease in equity capital.
51. See generally Group of Eminent Persons. supra note 6, at 39.
52. See United Nations, Report of the Secretariat, National Legislation and Regulations
Relating to Transnational Corporation, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/6 (1978) Tables D.6 et seq.;
Meeker, Fade-Out Joint Venture. 24 Inter-American Economic Affairs 27 (197 1); Ness, Brazil:
Local Equity Participation in Multinational Enterprises. 6 L. and Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1059 (1974).
53. See Dafiino, The Andean Code After Five Years, 8 Law. Am. 635, 669 (1976).
54. Latin American Economic Report, Nov. 19, 1976 at 1. For problems with divestment
and joint venture, see Franko, International Joint Ventures in Developing -Countries: Mystique
and Reality. 6 Law and Policy in International Business 315 (1974).
55. See Ness, supra note 52.
56. Supra note 35.
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As for non-fuel mineral contracts, divestment in the form of options of
governments to acquire a (majority) participation in a distant future have
been known for quite a while. 7 It is only since 1969 that equity participation
by nationals of the host country has become popular in some developing
countries, ranging from minority participation until, as more recently, ma-
jority participation. Our survey of 77 non-fuel minerals agreements shows
that in 29 agreements (particularly before 1971) no state participation at all
was contained and that increasingly at least some degree of state participa-
tion (mostly between 25 and 49 percent) is stipulated, be it as initial state
participation or as a participation target to be reached in 2 to 10 years. In
some contracts, the state has a corresponding option to gradually increase
either its own participation or the participation of its nationals. In In-
donesia, a country which has chosen investment agreements as the preferred
instrument to govern foreign investment, our survey of 15 non-fuel minerals
contracts shows that up to 1973, the general scheme (with one exception)
has been an initial participation of 2 to 5 percent, growing within 5-
10 years to ca. 25 percent. Since 1974, however, the growing pressure for
locally held equity is reflected in an initial participation of 5-10 percent, with
the final participation target of 25-51 percent to be reached within a max-
imum time of 10 years. Such an analysis, however, does not reflect the actual
implementation of the agreements, but more the changing standards of ex-
pectation which host countries hold when they negotiate.
TABLE V




than 25% 25%-49% than 49% ownership Total
Before 1967 - 1 3 - 4
1967-70 10 1 5 - 16
1971-73 6 5 3 2 16
1974-77 3 5 4 - 12
TOTAL 19 12 15 2 (TOTAL: 48)
(Only those contracts with national participation provisions were in-
cluded in the analysis.)
NOTE: 1976 Indonesian Model, is included
10 contracts are from 20 source:
29 of 77 contracts did not contain features of national participation
57. See Smith & Wells, supra note 9, at 131.
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TABLE VI
Indonesia: National Participation (Disinvestment)
TOTAL 1967-1970 1971-1973 1974-1977 TOTAL
Number of Agreements 6 5 4 15
Initial Local Participation 5-2% 5-? 1-10%
1-10% 1-5%
2-?
Final Participation Goal 5-20% 5-20% 2-25%
1-50% 2-51%
Number of Years required




A crucial distinction can be made between divestment leading to some
degree of national participation and divestment leading to majority own-
ership. Divestment can be arranged by offering shares to national citizens,
to the government, or to the state mining enterprises. Fade-out provisions
may set a fixed and invariable pattern of programmed divestment, a
timetable for the achievement of certain levels of national ownership, or
they may offer to the host government an option to buy shares at certain
events or times. This last provision is particularly interesting and may reflect
strong bargaining power of the host country. In modern mining agreements,
host countries often allow the TNC to explore (at its own risk and cost) and
reserve to themselves the option to buy a part (minority, majority, full
ownership) of the equity once exploration and feasibility studies are suc-
cessful. The exercise of the option may be at a pre-fixed reduced price level.
Compensation for the investor in such cases takes the form of long-term
sales commitments, compensation of exploration costs out of later produc-
tion/profits, and of some other incentives stipulated." However, such an
advantageous deal is only reluctantly accepted by such investors who are in-
tensively interested in developing the mineral (oil, uranium) in question, and
who are more concerned about securing a long-term supply commitment
than high profits."9
58. See a series of six petroleum agreements of 1974 in Iran. See also Donndorf
Cooperative Ventures with Developing Countries (paper for the International Symposium on
Uranium Supply and Demand, June 1977).
59. Accordingly, it has often been state enterprises from Western countries, less concerned
about profit, but more concerned about security of long-term supply of strategically important
energy, which have been ready to accept innovative contractual arrangements. Representative
contracts are the 1957 E.N.I. - Joint Ventures. the 1966 E.R.A.P. petroleum service agree-
ments and recently concluded uranium risk contracts, see Donndorf, Formen der inter-
nationalen Zusammenarkbeit auf dem Enerqierohstoff- Sektor 33 (1977); Zakharyia. New
Directions in the Search for and Development of Petroleum Resources in the Developing Coun-
tries, 9 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 545 (1976).
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Of importance in divestment schemes is whether the divestment is to be
made by an increase of capital or by a sale of those shares held by the TNC
to host country nationals or entities. Valuation of the price of the shares to
be used for divestment differs: the various alternatives range from pure
market value (over some privileges to nationals), to reevaluated and finally
to simple book value. 0 It is important if payment is to be made at once, or
by government secured bonds, or, not uncommonly, from the production or
the profits of the mining project. Frequently, precise criteria and procedures
for valuation are established in the agreement. However, host countries may
wish to reserve the negotiations for this important decision for a stage where
they already have a higher bargaining power than at the onset of the project.
Valuation criteria stipulated in the original contract will invariably reflect
the superior bargaining power of the TNC, as contrasted with book value
compensation in renegotiated divestment schemes.6
As much as divestment is praised and has become popular as a smooth
and peaceful instrument to achieve a contractual flexibility and a gradual
implementation of the objectives of permanent sovereignty, the concept and
its real effects must also be questioned. At first, the price to be paid for
divestment will have to be taken into account carefully. A government will
have to decide whether it is worthwhile to use its scarce financial resources
for acquiring equity in a mining venture, particularly when the equity passes
to the government at a time when the mining resources are close to being ex-
hausted. A survey of the timetables for divestment in a number of contracts
suggests that governments will often acquire full ownership at a time when
the minable resources are close to depletion.
One of the major objectives of divestment is the acquisition of a larger
share of the management and control of the venture. This objective can be
achieved as well by other means, such as a stipulated right of the govern-
ment to be represented on the board of directors and on the management
level. As far as financial revenues by dividends from equity are concerned,
the same result can be achieved by taxes and other levies. Often the very pur-
pose of gradually taking over the control of the investment is being thwarted
in spite of progressive divestment by the conclusion of management con-
tracts which grant the decision-making power over management to the
60. Compensation paid according to nationalizing legislation or relevant renegotiations
with the parent companies are increasingly based upon depreciated (sometimes updated) book
value, see U.N. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural resources (Annex), supra note 28; Girvan,
supra note 29, at 200.
Care should be taken to not overlook the fact that compensation is not only found in cash
payments based upon book value, but often, also, on highly advantageous service, technical
assistance, and shipping and management agreements constituting the legal form of a continua-
tion of the TNC's presence after nationalization. The compensatory character of such post-
nationalization agreements is particularly evident in the management agreements concluded in
Zambia and Zaire after nationalization. See Bostock & Harvey, Economic Independance and
Zambian Copper (1972), Lukoji, The Structure of Multinational Corporations in Zaire. in
Natural Resources and National Welfare, The Case of Copper 271 (Seidman ed. 1975); and in
Peru with Marcona Mining, see Gantz, 71 Am. J. Int'l L. 474 (1977).
61. Fritzsche & Stockmayer, Mining Agreements in Developing Countries: Issues of
Finance and Taxation, 2 Natural Resource Forum (215 1978).
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management contract partner.6 2 Countries which desire to maintain foreign
capital once invested should be wary about the capital out-flow effects of
divestment programs. 63 Perhaps provisions relating to reinvestment of
capital earned by divestment should be considered as a possible solution.
Finally, if no developed stock market and capital exists in the host country,
divestment obligations by offerings to local citizens may often not be feasi-
ble. In fact, a study on Southeast Asian divestment patterns6" found that
local participation requirements are met predominantly by divestment to
strawmen of national citizenship, the capital outlay for their purchase of
shares being financed by loans from the TNC. Thus, local participants were
kept under tight reins by the TNC. In other cases, local participation served
particularly to acquire local political support in the form of partnership with
local strong-men.
Divestment cannot be dismissed completely. It may, in combination
with other patterns, gradually increase national control and insert flexibility
into the contractual regime. The price of the divestment, who is going to
participate, what effects such participation will have in view of the objec-
tives of national sovereignty over natural resources, and what impact divest-
ment will have on the implementation of national control, should be
carefully considered. Divestment should be evaluated in comparison with
other instruments available with a view toward ensuring maximum effec-
tiveness of the objectives.
(e) Most-Favored Provisions
Another vehicle of revision of contractual terms and conditions is a
stipulation that a subsequent grant of better conditions to another party in
areas such as fiscal arrangements, price structure, methods of production,
and marketing and development of production area may give rise to a right
of the party of the first agreement to require the same conditions to be in-
serted in that agreement. Such most-favored (country or company) provi-
sions stem from the practice of commercial treaties of international law. The
grant of better conditions in a subsequent agreement to the party of the first
agreement can be stipulated to be automatic, or it may give rise to a right to
call for renegotiation of the first agreement. Most-favored company clauses
62. In petroleum, this has been a general pattern. In non-fuel minerals, management con-
tracts of this kind are to be found in the new Panama Copper Contract of 1976 and in the Zam-
bian and Zairean takeover of the foreign owned mining industry.
63. Sachdev, Divestment: A New Problem in Multinational Corporation Host Government
Inter-face, 16 Management International 23 (1976).
64. See Weinstein, Multinational Corporations and the Third World.- The case of Japan and
South East Asia, 30 Int'l Organization 373-89 (1976).
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are quite frequent in some concession contracts.65 TNC's have thus retained
the unilateral right to revise contractual terms in their favor. Such provi-
sions have been criticized. They inhibit governments in their subsequent
negotiations and they are difficult to implement, as it is very difficult to
single out individual provisions granting better conditions to the subsequent
partner from a network of other considerations and stipulations in the
whole agreement. The most-favored company clause has accordingly disap-
peared from sophisticated recent mineral contracts. On the other hand, the
rapid evolution of petroleum concessions, normally initiated in one country
and "leap-frogging" to other countries, has brought about a larger number
of most-favored country clauses, favoring the host country. 66 Such provi-
sions basically function as an instrument to bring about renegotiation
within the terms and procedure set by the initial contract, instead of
generating unnecessary disputes by forced upon revision of terms and condi-
tions. Those conflicts are caused by the pressure on the host country to
adapt its own petroleum concession terms to achievements in other
producer countries. An interesting "middle-of-the-way" solution is a short
duration (i.e., 5 years) of the initial contract, with a right of the TNC to
receive renewal but conditioned on its acceptance of terms agreed by other
foreign oil companies which have achieved similar production results.67 This
combination of short-term periods for the duration of the agreement,
together with rights for renewal under the terms prevailing at the time of the
renewal, appears to be a flexible and mutually acceptable way of adapting
mineral contracts without generating unnecessary conflicts.
5. Force Majeure, Assignment, Termination, Renewal
There are a number of other contractual instruments, which oc-
casionally contribute to greater flexibility of the contractual regime, even if
their main intention is directed towards other functions, In all those instru-
65. Particularly in agreements of TNCs with Franophonic countries in Africa. such provi-
sions favoring the company are very frequent, see, e.g., the Uranium agreement between the
Central African Republic (no Empire) and the French C.E.A. of 1969, art. C.F., Journal Of-
ficial, May 20, 1969, which reads:
Si pendant ]a dur6e de la presente convention une autre convention de concession
de urines de'uranium est signme par le Gouvernement et un tiers. It CEA on ses ayants
droit auront le droit d'obtenir, i leur demande, It ben6fice des clauses de Ia nouvelle
convention sils l'estiment plus favorable. A cet effet, une nouvelle convention sera
signe par les parties et annex6e A un d6cret modifiant It dicret institutif de la conces-
sion.
Petroleum agreements before the 1970's, also contain such clauses, Koweit-K.O.C. of
1966, in 28 P.L.M.E. A-I (Supp.); Iran-lminoco of 1965 in 4 O.P.E.C. Selected Documents 208
(1972); Abu Dhabi-A.D.P.C, of 1966, in 28 P.L.M.E. B-I (Supp); Fischer, supra note 39, at 340.
Their main purpose for the T.N.C. is to prevent a competitive advantage for a newcomer-
66. In Petroleum agreements, see Abu Dhabi-Mitsubishi of 1968. 26 P.L.M.E. A-I
(Supp.); Kuwait-Hispanoil of 1967 25 P.L.M.E. A-I (Supp.); 2 O.P.E.C. Documents 156
(1964); N.I.O.C.-A.G.I.P. of 1965 27 P.L.M.E. A-1 (Supp.) For legal issues and the differences
between the various types of most favored company and most favored country clauses, see
Fisher supra note 39, at 332.
67. See Rouhani. Assignment and Renegotiation (1973)- The important O.P.E.C. Resolu-
tion XVI. 90 supra note 3, relies strongly on better terms achieved by other countries in a com-
parable situation as a basis for renegotiation.
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ments, a trend towards greater sophistication and towards a contribution to
host country sovereignty and contractual flexibility can be observed.6 8 The
force majeure clause is drafted with increasing precision. In modern agree-
ments, care is taken that any force majeure, beyond the reasonable control
of the parties, does not unilaterally increase the obligations of the parties
beyond the previous balance. Such a clause may induce some renegotiation
once force majeure has taken place and once the consequences of such force
majeure change the contractual distribution of costs and benefits.
Agreements, in general, contain a provision as to the assignability of the
contract. 69 Traditionally, the TNC was entitled to assign its right from the
agreement freely. The current trend, however, increasingly restricts the
freedom of assignment: Consent by the state is generally required, and only
in some agreement is the state obliged not to refuse such consent without
reasonable justification; other restrictions, on assignment, grant to the state,
enterprise, a preemptive right to take over the contract or void assignment
to companies not domiciled in the host state. Assignment is only
facilitated when the assignor and the assignee are identical, and when
assignment of a part of the shares is necessary to increase the size of the in-
vesting consortium to obtain the necessary financing, provided that the
assignor is jointly responsible with the assignee for its obligations arising
from the agreement. Accordingly, assignment is certainly not a major in-
strument for inserting flexibility into the contractual regime. Yet, given the
requirement of government consent and a preemptive right, it can facilitate
the use of these rights for the host country as a bargaining lever to achieve
better terms subsequent to the initial contract.
The same is valid for the renewal clauses. If governments (as they in-
creasingly do) successfully insist on the renewal to be governed by terms and
conditions to be agreed at the time of renewal (eventually with a right of first
refusal or a privileged negotiation right of the investor), they can adjust the
contractual regime to the conditions prevailing at the time of renewal. If the
duration of the contract is rather short and various renewals are contem-
plated, renewal may even become a powerful instrument for a flexible
revision.
Governments and TNCs reserve themselves the right to terminate the
agreement if certain precisely defined events, such as absence of economic
feasibility of the project or default of the other party, occur. Termination
as such does not inject flexibility into the contractual regime. However, as a
heavy-handed yet quite effective sanction for inducing compliance of the
TNC with its obligations under the agreement, it may increase the host
country's position in the ongoing bargaining process during the implemen-
tation of the agreement. As with all other provisions reinforcing the host
country's position vis-d-vis the TNC, careful drafting of termination rights
68. See Delaume. Excuse for Nonperformance and Force Majeure in Economic Develop-
ment Agreements. 10 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 242 (1971); Eigen. Default, Termination and Sur-
render 155 (paper for the Buenos Aires Conference, 1973), supra note 9.
69. See Rouhani, supra note 9.
70. See Eigen, supra note 68.
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and of the consequences will contribute towards national sovereignty over
natural resources. Increasingly, the events justifying termination are set
down in more detail and encompass a larger range of possible defaults by
the TNC. As consequences of termination or expiration of the agreements,
all movable and non-movable assets generally become the governments'
property. The TNC will be required to restore any damages done to the land
and to recultivate the mined areas.
6. Assurance of Mining Rights in the Phases of Project Implementation
The distribution of costs and benefits from the investment between
TNC and host country.is decisively determined by the date on which the
final and comprehensive contractual regime is negotiated. If such an agree-
ment is negotiated early in the relationship, before the prospection or ex-
ploration stage, the TNC's superior bargaining power will generate terms
unilaterally favoring the investor."1 Such unilateral distribution of benefits
increases the probability of later demands for renegotiation by the host
country once the project's uncertainty and risk have disappeared and once
the project turns out to be highly profitable. A major objective in generating
long-term stability of the contractual regime by injecting flexibility into the
relationship between TNC and host country is a postponement of the
decisive negotiations until such date when the uncertainty and risk sur-
rounding the project have been considerably reduced. Such a point is
reached when the very risky and costly exploration and feasibility study
have been completed and when full information is available on the technical
and economic realities of the mining project. 2 This objective, i.e., the
postponement of the final negotiations, conflicts, however, with the
necessity of providing incentives for the TNC's sufficient to engage them in
the risky and costly pre-production activities.
Accordingly, a number of developments have taken place which allow
postponing the date of the negotiations for the final agreement. One
possibility is that the TNC undertakes exploration with a specific explora-
tion agreement which does not cover the later terms of the production
regime. Here, the investor needs at least a promise of cost recovery in case
the exploration is successful. This has been the practice in two recent major
copper projects. 3 Investors can rarely be induced to undertake exploration
if they do not receive a right of first negotiation, a right of first refusal, a
premium for successful exploration, or some other sufficiently substantial
financial incentive. The exploration agreement may also cover only basic
issues of a subsequent production contract, such as the target rate of return
71. See Kirchner, Schanze, Schlabrendorff, Stockmayer, W6ide, Fritzsche & Patzina,
Rohstofferschliessungsuorhaben in Entwicklungslffndern, 301 (1977); Moran, supra note 32, at
154.
72. See Eigen, The Negotiation Environment for Mining Agreements (1976).
73. In two major recent copper projects, the O.K. Tedi project in Papua New Guinea (ex-
ploration undertaken by Kennecott) and the Cerro Colorado project in Panama (exploration
undertaken by Canadian Javelin), the new agreement with DAMCO in Papua New Guinea and
with Texas Gulf (Panama) are apparently based upon the understanding that the exploration
costs will be refunded by the host country or the project company to the exploration company.
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and the basic features of the contract to be negotiated after the feasibility
study has been finalized.
The entry of home government entities, created not to maximize
profits, but to secure long-term minerals and energy supplies (petroleum,
uranium) by undertaking risky exploration and production in developing
countries, has also favored a postponement of the date of final negotiations.
Such government entities may be satisfied with a lower rate of return, with a
contractual form as required by the host government and by minority joint
venture or service contract forms, if they receive at least a guarantee of a
long-term supply of the production."' Accordingly, arrangements with
government entities appear to satisfy host country aspirations to a larger
degree than arrangements with TNCs. Finally, the capacity of host coun-
tries to undertake exploration efforts on their own, supported by technical
development aid and by the UN revolving fund,7" enhances their ability to
negotiate with TNCs at a more favorable date to reach a mutually accept-
able agreement than if negotiated before the uncertainty has been removed.
It can be expected that this trend of negotiating the major components of
mining contracts after exploration, either in the form of service, manage-
ment, or joint venture and concession contracts, will strengthen the stability
of contractual regimes and support host countries' aspirations for perma-
nent sovereignty.
7. Legislative and Administrative Measures to Enhance Contractual
Flexibility
The measure employed by host countries to unilaterally change the
terms of mineral extraction have already been mentioned: the exercise of
legislation powers to change the contractual regimes.
Also of interest are administrative measures provided in investment
regulations and administered by investment boards to control the perfor-
mance of the agreement by the TNC. Such measures can effect a revision of
the agreement. One instrument (Colombia) used for such purpose is the
authorization even of long-term contracts only for a short term (e.g., 3-5
years). Such short-term authorization leaves enough leverage with in-
vestment board to urge a revision of the contractual regime once the im-
plementation of the contract or the change of circumstances require such a
change."
74. This is the case with the Brazilian German Uranium-nuclear energy cooperation
agreement, see Donndorf, supra note 58. The 1974 Iranian petroleum service agreements with
Ultramar; Deminex, A.G.I.P., Ashland and C.F.P. provide, inter alia, that the:
General Contractor shall conduct and perform all the necessary operations ... supply
N.[O.C. [the Iranian Petroleum State Enterprise] with funds necessary ... [and that]
operations shall be carried out at the sole risk of the General Contractor.
In the case of commercial production, the fund, supplied by the contractor shall be reimbursed,
"As remuneration for services rendered for exploration and development, N.I.O.C. does
guarantee the sale of certain quantities of petroleum produced from the field ... developed by
the general contractor." Id.
75. See Bosson & Varon, The Mining Industry and the Developing Countries 198 (1977).,
76. Such a system of periodic administrative review and authorization allows a continuous
monitoring of the TNC's performance.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The survey of basic legal concepts, of actual renegotiations, and of the
evolution of the various instruments in legislation, in administration and in
mineral agreements between TNC's and host countries, reflects the reality
and the necessity for constant adjustment of mining investment in develop-
ing countries. The experience of the regimes for mineral extraction in major
developed mineral producers (Australia, Canada) is quite similar." The
conclusion to be drawn is that a careful and continuous learning process
relating to the negotiation and the drafting of the regimes for mining invest-
ment by TNC's has to adjust to these facts. The more the unavoidable
changes and revisions can be channeled by agreed procedures, the more un-
necessary costs of conflicts imposed on both parties can be avoided. In
negotiating such regimes, care must be taken not to overvalue any in-
dividual concept of achieving contractual flexibility because of the symbolic
value and the praise it may have received. Analysis brings out the dependen-
cies, weakness, and costs involved in choosing the various instruments
available to implement such a policy of gradual revision. Accordingly, care
must be taken to undertake a cost/benefit analysis of these instruments in
view of the objectives held by host countries, to recognize the important
linkages of various instruments in achieving flexibility within the major
areas of a mining regime: fiscal matters, economic performance objectives,
dispute settlement mechnaisms, and financing. The analysis has also shown
that objectives can often be reached by various instruments or by combina-
tions, and no single concept deserves absolute preference over others. The
current trend of injecting contractual flexibility into mining investment
regimes can be expected to continue until the main objectives of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources is reached and until the high dependency
of developing countries on the volatile world markets for their natural
resources has been reduced.7"
77. See Australian Industry Assistance Report. Canadian Ministry for Energy and
Natural Resources, Towards a Mineral Policy for Canada (1974): McKern. Multinational En-
terprise and Natural Resources (1976).
78. Long-term stability will in the end not come about by legal instruments alone, but by a
system of mutual interdependence between the parties concerned. As long as the foreign in-
vestor continues to render services of value to the host state and as long as the agreement is
fashioned flexible enough to adjust to the fast transition of the social, economic and political
structures of Third World countries, stability of the relationship as such - not only of the in-
dividual investment regime - is likely to exist. TNC's interested in obtaining such an "ultra-
stability", iLe. a flexible stability, willhence seek to put their development potential to the ser-
vice of the economic development objectives of host states. I have attempted to analyse the
relationship between economic development performance of the TNC and stability of invest-
ment terms in an article for Law & Policy in Int'l Business (forthcoming) entitled The Integra-
tion of Natural Resources Investment by TNC's into the National Economy of Developing Host
Countries
